|
|
|
Page
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8 9
10
Download full essay
Railroading remained dangerous
work in the 1920s and 1930s, but the risks changed dramatically.
The percentage of trainmen seriously injured at work declined
from the 1916 peak of 147 injuries per thousand men to
about sixty-one per thousand in 1929. The Great Depression
years drastically reduced freight and passenger traffic
on American railroads, but even when one accounts for
the decline in railroad traffic by considering the proportion
of injuries to a constant denominator of one thousand
railroad workers, the decrease in the risk of injury or
death faced by railroad workers during the 1920s and 1930s
is still striking. By 1938, the last year that a railroader’s
assumption of risk was allowed as a railroad company’s
defense under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
only about twenty-six out of one thousand trainmen suffered
serious injuries. The fatality rate among trainmen dropped
even more noticeably, from a post-1900 high averaging
9.2 deaths per thousand men in 1906 down to about two
deaths per thousand between 1924 and 1927, decreasing
even further to an average of 1.21 deaths among every
one thousand railroad trainmen in 1938. The improvements
in working conditions forced in part by federal laws,
the state workers’ compensation laws, and the railroads’
individual efforts to reduce risks and minimize the costs
of accidents are quite striking when viewed over a thirty-year
period.
The shift in managerial attitudes about ensuring safe
equipment and taking appropriate responsibility for the
well-being of railroad workers is most visible when the
experiences of South Shore railroad workers during the
Great Depression are examined and compared with the conditions
of Albert Fellers’s time twenty years earlier. Operating
achievements in 1930 declined only slightly from the record
performance of 1929, with a new speed record set, the
Electric Traction speed trophy retained for a second year,
a new freight terminal constructed at South Bend, a new
32,000 square-foot mechanical department building erected
at Michigan City and outfitted with the latest shop equipment,
and the original 1908 shop building renovated for use
as a car inspection and paint shop. More significantly
in human terms, though, the year 1930 brought no worker
fatalities for the first time in years, while the workforce
returned to the 1925–1927 size. Despite the reductions
in operating costs and deferral of maintenance arising
from the drop in traffic in 1931, the financial disaster
of 1932, and the descent into bankruptcy by autumn 1933,
the South Shore Line avoided any worker deaths throughout
most of the depression. While the incidence of injuries
also rose from 1929 through the end of 1931 and ranged
from four to ten times the national average for railroad
workers between 1930 and 1938, the railroad continued
to reduce the number of lost work days by 62 percent from
January until at least October 1931 and cut by 55 percent
the number of accidents causing at least temporary disability.
More significant, though, in terms of the railroad’s
financial survival is the way the company’s officials
treated workers and the way those workers responded during
the otherwise contentious and often violent crucible of
labor-management relations during the depths of the Great
Depression. Surviving anecdotal and statistical evidence
show how the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and
the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act functioned
not only to provide financial support for injured railroaders
but also to minimize the railroad’s expenditures
that might otherwise have been spent in litigation.
Anton Hoffman worked as a brakeman for the South Shore
out of Michigan City. The railroad’s general manager,
Charles M. Jones, personally considered Hoffman an experienced
brakeman, familiar with nighttime freight switching operations
and certainly worth his wages of a hundred dollars a month.
Sometime between midnight and dawn on 1 June 1932, Hoffman
was working a South Shore freight switching job near Marshall
Street in Gary, Indiana, just as he had done at Gary many
times before. He stepped down from a cut of freight cars
to throw a switch, then signaled the engineer to move
the cars. As the cut of cars approached Hoffman, he took
hold of the grab iron and placed one foot on the stirrup
of the leading car. Unexpectedly, his foot slipped the
length of the stirrup, throwing him against the side of
the moving car. His body then swung outward and the back
of his head and his shoulders struck a wooden catenary
support pole only twenty-eight inches from the car side.
The impact knocked him to the ground and caused a headache,
but he got back up, climbed aboard a following car, and
finished his shift. Several months later Hoffman noticed
a slight impairment of vision. Over the next two years,
the impairment developed to the point where Hoffman no
longer could see anything except light and dark shadows.
The forty-six-year-old Hoffman was legally blind and unable
to work to support his wife.
Fewer than three weeks later, another brakeman named George
Burgwald was working a nighttime switching job near East
Chicago the night of 19 June 1932, when the automatic
couplers on two freight cars did not catch. Company rules
prohibited trainmen from entering between moving cars,
but practical railroading experience usually required
a man to couple the cars, or risk the wrath of the dispatcher
for leaving a freight train uncoupled and blocking the
main line and siding. Burgwald slid between the two freight
cars to adjust the uncooperative coupler. As he stood
between the cars, either the engineer moved the train
or the shock wave from the attempted coupling rebounded
through the cars, knocking Burgwald down between the cars.
A wheel crushed his left leg. After a nineteen-week recuperation
at St. Catherine’s Hospital in East Chicago, he
returned home to Michigan City, where he underwent subsequent
surgeries at St. Anthony’s Hospital. Two years after
the injury Burgwald’s left leg measured two inches
shorter than his right leg and he was unable to perform
any type of physical labor.
An investigation of the accident scene following Hoffman’s
injury revealed that the distance between the outer edge
of the car stirrup and the face of the pole measured only
about two feet, four inches, where a safe clearance should
have been at least three feet. Hoffman filed a claim with
the railroad company under the provisions of the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act. After a prolonged negotiation
between Hoffman’s attorney and the railroad’s
attorney, railroad officials agreed to pay Hoffman $3,000—the
equivalent of two and one-half years of wages. Under chapter
77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1933, a worker’s
claim arising from a work-related injury was a preferred
claim, second only to the administrative costs of the
receivership or reorganization. General manager Jones
signed a petition on 22 May 1934, requesting that the
federal court allow the railroad to pay Hoffman the $3,000.
The next day, Judge Thomas Slick of South Bend complied.
Burgwald’s accident, while certainly regrettable,
resulted from a violation of company rules, according
to railroad officials, so the company did not accept liability
for his injury. Burgwald countered with the cause for
his entry between the cars: one of the automatic couplers
was defective and would not couple. His reaction revealed
a common complaint of freight brakemen. A Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad (B &O) worker once responded angrily
to a Safety First poster that urged railroaders not to
go between cars to adjust a coupler. If the couplers worked
properly and were not defective, the B & O man pointed
out, men would not have to risk their lives to compensate
for the inferior equipment. In Burgwald’s case,
more than a year and a half of negotiations failed to
bring the railroad and the brakeman to a compromise. On
26 March 1934 Burgwald filed suit in the United States
District Court at Hammond, Indiana, seeking $40,000 in
damages according to the terms of the Federal Employers’
Liability Act and the Safety Appliance Act.
Unlike the trial conducted in the same federal court in
Hammond nineteen years earlier to decide the question
of liability for Albert Fellers’ death, Burgwald’s
case found a fairer hearing before Judge Slick, the successor
to now-retired Judge Anderson. The terms of the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act clearly applied to Burgwald’s
accident; a railroader could not be held to have assumed
the risk of his employment if the defective equipment
that caused his injury violated a railroad safety statute.
After Judge Slick overruled the railroad attorney’s
assertion that the brakeman’s complaint was too
vague because it did not give the name of the railroad
car’s owner, nor its number, the railroad’s
attorneys filed a petition for a stay of proceedings on
4 December 1934 to resume negotiations. Four days later,
the South Shore agreed to pay the permanently disabled
brakeman $6,000—the equivalent of five years of
a brakeman’s wages. Slick, who also was serving
as judge in the railroad’s bankruptcy proceedings,
signed the court order approving the settlement that same
day. Despite the fact that the average real cost to a
railroad company for a worker’s serious injury had
risen about 70 percent between 1910 and 1932, the $6,000
settlement actually cost the railroad less than one $5,000
court-ordered judgment for passenger injuries in 1917.
What is more significant about Burgwald’s lawsuit
is the fact that it was one of only two filed by an injured
railroad worker against the South Shore Line between 1933
and 1938, and possibly during the entirety of the depression.
Surviving records, concerning about eighty-one accidental
injury claims by seventy-five workers among a total 325
claims filed over a four-year period from 25 May 1934
through 15 May 1938, reveal that injured workers were
paid through administrative channels, without litigation,
under the terms of the federal or state acts. The $6,000
awarded to Burgwald and the $3,000 given to Hoffman comprised
not only the two largest payments to workers, but apparently
also 60 percent of all monies paid for injuries to workers
during those four years. Car inspector Bernard Kabacinski
broke his right leg while trying to remove a fuse and
suffered partial permanent disability as a result. The
railroad provided him with slightly less than $1,000 under
the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act. Maintenance
of way worker Steve Wyatt suffered a permanently disabling
injury on 13 February 1936. The railroad supported him
with at least $933 in seven installments between May 1936
and September 1937. Car inspector Fred Raska suffered
partial blindness in his right eye when ice or rust flew
off multiple-unit jumper cables he was handling between
cars and received $399 under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act. Two years later, he remained with the shop
force. Most claims amount to just a few dollars, but those
few dollars amounted to a day or more of lost wages.
Among the names of injured workers listed in the records
as recipients of financial support during the depression
years are: Howard Kroenig, who rescued passengers in the
1926 collision and who wrote the poem “Safety First”
for publication, receiving about half a month’s
pay for an injury suffered in December 1936; Arthur Hegelmayer,
author of an essay about accident prevention, who incurred
minor injuries in November 1936 and July 1937; Lester
C. Harman, author of “Rule 99,” who suffered
a serious, temporarily disabling injury in October 1937;
and Wilbert J. Hedstrom, brother and uncle of two generations
of Hedstrom motormen, who received the equivalent of a
week’s wages around Thanksgiving 1935 for an unspecified
injury.
What made railroad workers stay with the South Shore Line,
despite the dramatically higher risk of a disabling injury—a
risk that grew the longer they stayed. What made South
Shore employees accept substantially lower wages than
the steam railroads, steel mills, and railroad car and
automobile manufacturing plants of northern Indiana could
offer? Why did so many persist in working for an electric
railroad, when Pullman-Standard in Michigan City or Inland
Steel in Indiana Harbor paid more during the shaky years
of the depression? A hint at the possible answer can be
found in Ed Hedstrom’s recollection of the experience
of working for the South Shore Line under general manager
Charles M. Jones:
And you know, that’s one of the
real nice things that happens when you work for a family
company. . . . And the South Shore certainly was. And
Mr. Jones, Mr. Charlie Jones, could go out and talk
to any person on that railroad, and call them by their
first name. And you could call him “Charlie”—you
could call him “Charlie” if you wanted to,
he wouldn’t object if you’d call him Mr.
Jones, but he didn’t object if you called him
“Charlie” either.
Much of the experience of
working for the electric interurban railroads of the early
twentieth-century Midwest, including the South Shore Line,
remains forgotten or obscured by the passing of time and
the loss of historical documentation. Very little is known
about the role played by workers’ own labor unions
in achieving improvements in work conditions ocer the decades,
for example. On the South Shore Line, motormen maintained
an affiliation with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen until about 1925 or 1926, when a separate
railroad union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
took over the representation of motormen. Conductors belonged
to the Order of Railway Conductors as early as May 1927,
while forty-four South Shore brakemen, collectors, and other
trainmen formed Lodge 982 of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen on 19 March 1929. Freight handlers, station porters,
and clerks were represented by the Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks as early as 11 June 1934, when the
union and South Shore officials entered into a labor agreement.
Individual linemen, car men, and shop workers may have held
memberships in the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, the Brotherhood of Railway Car men, the International
Association of Machinists, or other labor unions, but no
evidence from the 1920s or early 1930s indicates that the
unions influenced work conditions. Indeed, the improvements
in railroad worker safety on the South Shore beginning in
1926 appear to have taken place at the volition of company
officials, not because of significant union pressure.112
Over the course of thirty years from the passage of the
Federal Employers Liability Act in 1908 to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in early 1938 that the South Shore
was subject to the Railway Labor Act, a fundamental shift
in judicial and railroad managers’ attitudes about
worker safety accomplished much to improve the work conditions
and well-being of railroaders on the South Shore Line.113
Efforts to educate company officials, foremen, and the workers
themselves achieved important changes in defining what was
acceptable danger for a worker. Reengineered work processes
and equipment capitalized on existing technology to reduce
sizably the risks of accidental injuries or deaths. The
improvements in work conditions manifested themselves, for
example, in the elevating, pivoting platform and railings
atop South Shore’s line car 1101, rebuilt in 1927
from an old passenger car, and in the employment of safer
numbers of men—five linemen, two groundmen, and a
foreman—in line crews. A succeeding generation of
railroad maintenance equipment, line car 1100, was rebuilt
in 1947 from an Indiana Railroad car with the innovations
of 1927 prominently featured and improved. The safety features
and practices that aroused controversy in 1914 had become
acceptable by 1927 and an industrial standard by 1947.114
Indeed, much about railroading had changed by 1938. The
Railway Labor Act, as amended in 1934, provided workers
on the South Shore Line with federally recognized collective
bargaining rights, while the Railroad Retirement Act of
1937 supported unemployed, injured, or aged railroad men
and women in securing the daily material necessities for
living. In 1936 the Interstate Commerce Commission changed
its categorization of the South Shore from an interurban
line to an electrified mainline railroad.115 More significantly,
though, the majority of electric interurban railroads had
simply disappeared by 1938 or were on the verge of abandonment,
due to federal and state government financing of paved road
construction at the expense of railroad right-of-way taxation,
declines in ridership due to the encouragement of a consumer
automobile culture, the lack of adequate freight revenue
during the depression years, and hostile federal securities
legislation that prohibited the types of holding companies
that made electric utilities and interurban lines mutually
supportive. Sadly, the dismantling of those electric interurban
railroads for the market price of scrap metal also ended
a unique experience for the men and women who found employment
in the electric railroad industry during the early twentieth
century and made it a way of life. The stories of those
railroad workers, like the interurban lines, are irretrievably
lost.116
|
|
|